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 We live under democratic regimes. We don’t live too badly. We think this 
depends (in part) on the fact that we live under democratic regimes. Hence, we may 
find those regimes good in this respect. But is democracy really justified? And are we 
to take its outcomes as legitimate even though we may find them sometimes plainly 
wrong? In my paper I want to tackle these two related issues that concern democracy: 
its justification and legitimacy1.  
 First of all, I intend to clarify a small confusion that happens to blur the 
debate: the one between single outcomes and democratic procedures. This may seem 
a minor point, but it is relevant if we aim to account for the so-called circumstances of 
politics (Waldron 1999). In order to understand why the fact that we disagree over 
some specific outcomes does not immediately give us reasons to disobey, we need to 
bear in mind that justification and legitimacy of a single outcome come quite apart. If 
that is the case, democratic legitimacy depends on the kind of procedure that issued 
legitimate outcomes2.  
 Once we turn to the justification of democratic procedure, we are at a 
crossroads. There are two well-known broad approaches to the justification of 
democracy: instrumentalism and proceduralism. My second aim in this paper is to 
propose a new ground to draw a line between these two and to reframe such 
opposition as instrumentalism versus intrinsicalism. While instrumentalism qualifies 
those accounts that view democracy as a contingent means to realize some further 
value or interest, intrinsicalism takes democracy to be a necessary, though perhaps not 
sufficient, condition to the realization of other aims. 
 Therefore, I intend to argue that: (a) a proper justification ought to aim at 
making democracy possess the right to rule, and hence its outcomes legitimate; (b) a 
proper justification also requires to conceive an independent criterion that acts as 
justifier of democracy; (c) the connection between such criterion and democracy itself 
may be either necessary or contingent.  
 The paper is organized as follows. The first section regards the distinction 
between justification and legitimacy of outcomes. I start by categorizing four aspects 
in justification and legitimacy that ought to be analyzed together. I take Waldron’s 
circumstances of politics to be a good reason to draw a line between the two and I 
argue that outcome legitimacy depends on the procedure that issues it. Section two 
introduces a reformulation of the possible justifications of democracy and proposes to 
                                                        
1  In this paper, I take democracy canonically to stand for majority rule of decision-making and 
fundamental rights protection. 
2  As Peter argues, there are at least three grounds for legitimacy: consent, beneficial effects and 
democratic procedure. While the former identifies legitimate authority with individuals’ consenting to 
it (and thus conveys no normative force); the second revolves around authority’s beneficial 
consequences and requires people to obey authority insofar as it brings positive outcomes. My whole 
paper will stand within the third category and I won’t discuss the other two.  
use an independent criterion whose connection to democracy serves as qualifier of the 




 Both justification and legitimacy are multifaceted concepts that can regard 
different domains of normative political theory. First, we can say that a decision is 
justified or legitimate, and we mean different things by using one adjective or the 
other. But second, we can also question the justification or legitimacy of the authority 
that issues such decisions. We can then ask whether a certain procedure for taking the 
decision is legitimate or justified. Or, we can wonder whether the exercise of coercive 
power or political authority in the society we live in are justified or legitimate3. All 
these attributions are slightly different and help making the distinction between these 
two concepts more confused for those who address it. Therefore, it may be of some 
utility trying to specify what the objects to which ‘legitimacy’ or ‘justification’ is 
being predicated are 4 . We can distinguish among: (a) the object of 
justification/legitimacy, namely what is to be qualified as justified/legitimate; (b) the 
proper definition of justification/legitimacy, that is what we mean by saying that 
something is justified or legitimate, whether there are considerations in favor of x or x 
possesses a right to rule; (c) the grounds for qualification or the conditions which are 
to be met for the object to be justified/legitimate; (d) the consequence of such 
qualification, that is, the things that justification/legitimacy of a certain object entails. 
 For instance, when we talk of the object of justification we may refer to 
collective decisions and laws: a law is justified to us5 if we believe there are good 
reasons for supporting it concerning its merit and substance. On the contrary, when 
we say that a law is legitimate, we generally refer to the way it has been produced and 
we mean that this way was correct6. Second, the proper definition of legitimacy and 
justification is a matter of bitter debates and it is not easy to settle. To be sure, 
justification may refer to the presentation of objective considerations in favor of 
something or to a practice of self-clarification that starts with shared premises and 
attempts to arrive at a unique conclusion. On the other hand, we can interpret 
                                                        
3 As both Peter (2013, 2016) and Perry (2013) notice, there are at least two approaches to the problem 
of political legitimacy: the first is authority-based (Raz 1986, Christiano 2006, Perry 2013), while the 
second is coercion-based (Ripstein 2004, Rawls 1993, Peter 2008).  
4 We may hence distinguish among: (a) the object of justification/legitimacy, namely what is to be 
qualified as justified/legitimate; (b) the proper definition of justification/legitimacy, that is what we 
mean by saying that something is justified or legitimate, whether that there are considerations in favor 
of x or that x possesses a right to rule; (c) the grounds for qualification or the conditions which are to 
be met for the object to be justified/legitimate; (d) the consequence of such qualification, that is, the 
things that justification/legitimacy of a certain object entails. In this paper I will let aside the third 
requirement.  
5 As for what concerns this paper, I need not make a distinction between externalist and internalist 
justification (see Gaus 1996).  
6 The specific way does not matter here, it can be democratic, autocratic or 
teocratic, the point remains that the outcome is legitimate in virtue of the way it 
has been produced. 
legitimacy in more than one way, naturally. For the sake of this paper, I will focus 
only on normative readings of legitimacy and notably on two of them: legitimacy as a 
liberty-right or legitimacy as a claim-right to rule7. In the first case, legitimacy boils 
down to justified coercion, as generally those who endorse such account takes 
legitimacy to apply to political power and to qualify political power as essentially 
coercive (Ladenson 1980, Rawls 1993, Buchanan 2002, Ripstein 2004, Estlund 2008, 
Peter 2008). On the other hand, legitimacy as a right to rule entails explicitly political 
obligation on the part of those subject to the legitimate authority and hence interpret 
legitimacy as a claim-right to which corresponds someone else’s (subjects’) duties 
(Raz 1986, Simmons 1999, Christiano 2006, Perry 2013)8. I do not intend to defend 
one reading over the other, as here I am concerned with the relation between 
justification and legitimacy. So all I have to say further in the paper applies to both 
accounts. Third, grounds for justification or legitimacy also greatly differ. On public 
reason accounts, it seems that the conditions under which we can say that a practice of 
justification has succeeded at least relate to, if they do not depend on, the capacity of 
justification to lead to consensus; while on objective view accounts, a justification is 
successful only if it leads to truth, irrespective of what those who participate in it 
think. On the side of legitimacy, instead, many different grounds have been proposed, 
ranging from consent, to beneficial effects, to the fairness principle or the democratic 
procedure. Finally, the consequences of a successful justification depend on the moral 
motivation view we endorse. If we have an internalist account of moral motivation, 
for instance, some course of action will be justified if it will accord to the agent’s 
motivational set of reasons and hence a successful justification will be able to move 
the agent accordingly. Thinking of legitimacy, a claim-right view connects political 
legitimacy with obligation and thus takes it to entail a duty to comply on the subjects’ 
part. All these dimensions are strictly connected and not all possible combinations are 
compatible. In this paper, I aim to uncover some relations between these dimensions, 
in particular concerning the relationship between justification and democratic 
accounts of legitimacy. 
 First of all, let us start with collective decision. We generally take a law to be 
justified if there are good reasons in its favor and unjustified in case there aren’t. 
Nevertheless, a law may also be legitimate without being justified and this is when we 
think it possesses authority without being right or correct. In case of laws, the 
                                                        
7 For an essential analysis of the concept see Peter 2016. Any proper analysis of the concept of 
legitimacy is particularly troubling because it calls into question many other normative concepts that 
are deeply connected with it, like authority, political obligation and justice, as well as the very 
normative/descriptive divide. For this paper, I will focus on a normative interpretation of legitimacy, 
and let aside Weberian-like descriptive accounts of it. See Weber 1964. 
8 In both case the literature makes vast use of Hohefeldian classification of rights, duties, power and 
liability, even though not all of them endorse the correlativity of right and duty view. See Hohfeld 
1917, Whitely 1952-53, Hart 1955, Brandt 1964. Against the correlativity view see Lyons 1970, 
Feinberg 1966. It is important to notice that while it is true that liberty-right interpretations of 
legitimacy generally take it as applying to political power rather than to authority, it is not true that all 
applications of legitimacy to political power rather than authority interpret legitimacy as a liberty-right. 
Hence, the distinction between liberty-right and claim-right legitimacy is not equivalent to the 
distinction in the object of application of legitimacy, that is political power or authority. 
distinction between legitimacy and justification is evident and democracy-based 
accounts of legitimacy hold that the way a decision has been made determines its 
authoritativeness in a content-independent way. Probably, if we were to agree with 
every single collective decision, either because we take it to be intrinsically just or 
correct, or because we find it instrumentally useful to realize our aims and ends, no 
issue of political legitimacy would arise. We would just agree on the content of public 
decisions and act according to both such decisions and our own judgment9. A little 
thought-experiment may be of help here. If we lived in a very bizarre social world 
where we all agreed on every single issue and we knew that we so agreed, it seems 
like we would be able to act accordingly and harmonize spontaneously. To be sure, 
we would still have to take collective decisions in order to coordinate and hence 
would need a decision-making procedure of some kind. For instance, if we all knew 
that a certain mysterious machine always provides the right decision on every single 
issue, we would still make collectively binding decisions following a certain 
procedure, that is “Go and ask to the Mysterious Omniscient Machine”. If we were to 
know (and know that all of us know) that this is the best way to take correct decisions 
and if we were to agree that we always ought to respect correct decisions and we were 
spontaneously willing so to act, not only would we get along peacefully, but also we 
would probably can go without democracy. We would still make use of justificatory 
practices, in the sense of asking and giving each other reasons for our actions. In the 
mysterious machine case it would probably always be the same kind of justification. 
To a question like: “Why are you killing that lamb?”, the only answer would always 
be: “Because the Mysterious Machine told me to”. Or, if we were to agree on a 
procedure like “Each does as she pleases”, because all our actions and thoughts were 
to harmonize spontaneously, we would still not know why another person acted in a 
certain way, and it would make sense for us to ask each other reasons for our 
behavior. Despite publicly known agreement on every issue, we would still wonder 
why we do so agree. Individuals populating these counterfactual worlds would not 
know everything and hence they would need justification as a self-clarification 
practice, but their getting along peacefully would not hinge on it.  
 These would be very bizarre and perhaps boring worlds. Nonetheless, such 
counterfactuals tell us something about the concept of legitimacy. For they show that 
it possesses a particular standing because it involves the use of coercive power or the 
imposition of duties on people who are subjects to it and may disagree with the way 
that power is exercised. Let us take the two examples of possible definition of 
legitimacy. In both cases this notion serves to say that it is permissible for some entity 
to coercively impose decisions on or to demands compliance by others, whether they 
like it or not. As for legitimate coercion, it is easy to see why. Since coercion is 
generally thought to be a bad thing, it can be morally permissible only under certain 
circumstances and legitimacy is taken to identify what these circumstances are. On 
                                                        
9 In a relevant way, we could not be said to obey to anything, since we would respect the law willingly 
and spontaneously, even though this depends on what we take obedience to consist of and it is true 
only if we take it to require some sort of disagreement with the reasons behind the action made in order 
to obey. 
the other hand, if we endorse a claim-right interpretation of legitimacy, the fact that a 
decision, a procedure, a political regime or an authority are legitimate entails that 
people under them are required to obey. While it can be the case that I willingly 
comply with decisions I agree with, the point of legitimacy is that it does not matter 
whether I do agree or not. Even though I think some collective decision is plainly 
wrong, if it is legitimate is nonetheless binding, hence I have to obey it10. Therefore, 
when we provide arguments for taking some entity as legitimate, we are also stating 
that this entity possesses a particularly strong right, that is, the right to coerce us or to 
impose duties on us. In our counterfactual examples, the fact that individuals agree 
over every single political issue and that are willing to comply entails that no exercise 
of coercive power and no imposition of duties is necessary, as people agree on what is 
right and act accordingly11. Since we happen to regularly disagree over what is just or 
correct or useful, as well as we happen to have different aims, plans of life and 
worldviews, in order to get along together peacefully and to coordinate, we need to 
forego the justification of each and every collective decision, and instead assess the 
legitimacy of single decisions. 
 These are known to be the ‘circumstances of politics’ that Waldron set up by 
modifying Rawlsian ‘circumstances of justice’ (Waldron 1999; Rawls 1971, 1993). 
Waldron lays out two circumstances, which are the fact of disagreement and the need 
for cooperation, that together determine a switch from the justification of single 
outcomes to the justification of procedures that issue such outcomes. According to 
him, to the extent that procedures are justified, the outcome can be taken as legitimate 
in virtue of its being correctly lent out of a correctly followed procedure. Such switch 
from justification of particular decisions to procedures constitutes a sort of 
recognition of human limits and contingencies affecting our political life. The need 
for some sort of cooperation is such that we ought to do “as if” we all agreed on what 
binds all of us. Except that we do not agree. So factual circumstances require us to 
replace justification with legitimacy.  
 However, contrary to what Waldron seems to hold, this does not settle all 
disputes and especially does not forgo justification at all. In fact, if it is undoubtedly 
true that matters of justice are controversial, as Waldron reproaches to Rawls, it is 
indeed also true that matters of procedures and of procedural fairness are 
controversial as well12. Perhaps we can safely say that democracy is at least morally 
permissible, if not plainly the best possible decision-making procedure. But, even if 
we can hope to reach such unanimous consensus, which is unlikely if we confront 
                                                        
10 Raz takes this to be a property of authority, that of issuing content-independent and pre-emptive 
reasons for action (Raz 1986, 2006). However, if laws can be legitimate even though unjustified, then 
content-independence qualifies also legitimacy even when it does not apply to political authority. 
11 To be sure, sanctions are necessary to back up political decisions because of the particular instability 
that others’ noncompliance may generate. This means that coercive power would be necessary even in 
case we all knew and agreed on what is right or wrong, simply because we could not be ensured of 
people’s compliance otherwise. The fact that human nature can be morally flawed, however, is a 
contingent fact that I will set aside for the aim of this paper. Let’s imagine for the sake of the argument, 
then, that people spontaneously do what they believe it is just and agree to.  
12 On this see Enoch 2007 and Christiano 2000.  
ourselves with all human societies, still there would be room to argue over which kind 
of democracy would be the best or most suited to us. Thus, in order to argue for a 
more populist, more ‘epistocratic’, more liberal or more majoritarian democracy, we 
would better focus on which characteristics are fundamental in the justification of 
democracy we all pretend to accept. Since consent on procedures does not occur, 
procedures as well ought to be justified. If the argument is sound, then, legitimacy is 
not independent from justification, contrary to what John A. Simmons affirms. 
Simmons’s main point is that any kind of justification consists in “the impersonal 
presentation of objectively good reasons or good arguments to a conclusion” 
(Simmons 1999, 762). Hence, when justifying a political regime, we must conceive of 
ourselves as engaging in the enterprise of giving reasons to take such regime as 
“prudentially rational, morally acceptable, or both” (Simmons 1999, 740). On the 
contrary, to argue for the legitimacy of a state entails a very different conclusion, 
whilst requiring a very different activity. In fact, since political legitimacy concerns a 
“complex moral right to be the exclusive imposer of binding duties to its subjects, and 
to use coercion to enforce these duties” (Simmons 1999, 764), it cannot be vindicated 
without reference to individual subjects’ consent to it. Therefore, according to 
Simmons, while justification asks only for objective considerations that are true or 
false irrespective of what people feel about it, the legitimacy of a political regime 
cannot uncouple from people’s effective consent to the regime’s ownership and 
exercise of such a right. 
 However, Simmons appears to mistakenly conflate two things. Since he 
tackles the justification of the state, he does not pay heed to the distinction between 
the justification of single political decisions and of procedures. More than that, he 
admits that single decisions may be perfectly justified without this entailing that the 
authority or procedure that issued them is legitimate. Thus, he does not put in 
question practical consequences of justification, as the fact that we ought to do what is 
just. For the sake of the argument, let us assume that we always ought to respect and 
obey a justified decision and that we would agree with people coercing us to do so if 
we were so fool as not to comply ourselves13. The fact of disagreement entails that no 
single political decision will be perceived by all to be justified and since we need 
cooperation nonetheless, we ought to turn to the way the decision is taken in order to 
see whether it can be seen as legitimate, although unjustified, by all. What Simmons 
claims is that the only way a procedure can be legitimate in such sense is if it has been 
consented to. However, this concerns the ground of legitimacy, which Simmons 
identifies only with actual consent. But the fact that justifying the objective value of a 
regime is different from justifying its exercise of legitimate power does not amount to 
saying that any form of justification is not a good ground for legitimacy. In the former 
                                                        
13 This is indeed a relevant idealization. However, since most theories of democracy seem to deal with 
people interested only in justice, however conceived, such idealization, either right or wrong, is a quite 
common feature in democratic literature. The question of coercion is different, though. I may agree that 
we ought to do what is just and I may think I have a duty to do what is just without this entailing that 
someone else, like the state, has a right to coerce me to do what I ought to. This seems to be the point 
of most anarchist theories and certainly Simmons’s. I think that the need of cooperation here plays a 
role, but I cannot deal with this problem here. 
case, Simmons can be taken to state that justification as providing reasons to think 
that something is just is different from providing reasons to think that something is 
legitimate and hence has a right to rule. I do endorse such a claim. However, then 
Simmons reads this claims as implying that justification is not a good ground for 
legitimacy. But this seems unwarranted. While a regime can be just without having 
the right to coerce me14, it is not necessarily the case that the only way a regime can 
acquire such right to coerce me is through consent. A good justification of a political 
regime can entail that such regime possesses this right, but it does so only if it 
addresses the problem of the regime’s legitimacy rather than its value. 
 It is true that we disagree over what decisions are the right ones. It is also true 
that we do disagree over what procedures, or at least what forms of democratic 
procedures, are the best ones. When we aim to justify democracy as a legitimate 
regime, though, we ought not to focus on why democracy has value or on what makes 




 Once the focus is perspicuously set on procedures, there is a sort of 
embarrassment in still hearing talks over proceduralism and procedural values. As a 
matter of fact, normative theories that plan to justify democracy are usually divided in 
two broad categories: instrumentalism and proceduralism. However, since both of 
them deal with procedures, as it is manifest so far, both accounts cannot but be 
‘procedural’ in a way, as these are the objects they set up to justify. How can then 
proceduralism be a meaningful account of justification for a procedure?  
 Hoping to shed some lights, I will now reframe the traditional distinction just 
mentioned in a distinction between instrumentalism and ‘intrinsicalism’. While the 
former account, as it is well-known, justifies democracy as a means to realize 
something else, the latter justifies democracy in virtue of some value democratic 
procedures embody. I think that this distinction hinges on the existence of an 
independent criterion, and in particular on the relationship between said criterion and 
democratic process itself. 
 Let us start with instrumentalism. Instrumentalists take democracy to be a 
means to something else, which is the ‘real value’ they are after. It can be equality, as 
it is with Richard Arneson (2003), or it can be some moral virtue democratic process 
which allows citizens to realize through participation, with John Stuart Mill (1861). 
Be it the outcome or the by-product, still democratic procedure is taken to be the best 
way to achieve such result. However, democracy does so only in a contingent way: it 
is because nowadays contingent conditions that democracy appears to be the most 
suited way to achieve the justifying value. Even though we do not foresee when, still 
it is possible for us to realize the very same things without any use of democracy. It is 
                                                        
14 Or without me having a duty to obey to it. 
not that such justification is piecemeal, as Thomas Christiano claims15, because we 
can consistently take it to be valid for all subjects and for all outcomes. In fact, any 
instrumentalist account, so long as it proposes a justification of democratic 
procedures, will confer legitimacy to democratic outcomes in virtue of being 
produced by the appropriate procedures and will justify these procedures because they 
tend to produce on average outcomes that respect the relevant value that works as 
independent criterion of justification. It would make little sense to justify a procedure 
in virtue of its granting only and all just results, at least because the first wrong 
outcome would destroy the whole justification of a procedure. What we ought to take 
instrumentalism to hold, then, is that democratic procedures are justified insofar as 
they represent a contingent means that on average produces results (be they direct 
outcomes or by-products) conforming to the relevant value or set of values that 
instrumentalists take to justify democracy.  
 On the contrary, intrinsicalism conceives the relation between the independent 
criterion and democracy in a quite different way. The kind of value that justifies 
democracy is here necessarily achieved through democracy. Hence, democratic 
procedures play a determinant role, as they represent a necessary condition for the 
justifying value, whose fulfillment cannot be obtained without democracy. It is still a 
procedure-independent criterion, for it means to justify the procedure itself, but it is a 
criterion that, though may be theoretically conceived as distinct from democracy, 
cannot be realized without democracy being realized. In a way, democracy may be 
said to embody such value and thus cannot be left aside if we want that value to 
become real. We can take some values to be more prone to intrinsicalist justifications 
rather than others: for instance, mutual accountability or fairness or political equality, 
insofar as they concern the kind of relations citizens should enjoy with one another, 
seem more suited than some moral perfectionist virtue or negative freedom. But this 
fact does not make them essentially procedural, because the essence of a value does 
not depend on the way it is used within a philosophical theory. 
 If the goal of democratic theorists is to justify democratic procedures and in 
particular their right to issue decisions that we all ought to obey, they cannot do so 
without making reference to something else. To be sure we can all agree that 
democracy is the best decision-making procedure and we can also think that from this 
fact its legitimacy stems. In this case the endeavor of justification would amount to 
some sort of self-clarification practice (Rawls 1993), where we try to see what we 
find really valuable in democracy and take for granted that, insofar as it is valuable, 
democracy is also legitimate. However, if democracy is to be justified as a legitimate 
decision-making procedure, such justification ought to address people who disagree. 
For these people are the ones who mostly need some form of justification, since they 
may be forced to obey to decisions that they not only find wrong, but also illegitimate, 
since they are produced by a procedure that they see as unjustified. Any convincing 
                                                        
15 Thomas Christiano proposes to draw a distinction between piecemeal and holistic justifications and 
states that instrumentalist justification will depend on the subject and on the class of decisions taken, 
thus being piecemeal, while proceduralist accounts are holistic, because they ground democratic 
authority in the same way for all citizens (Christiano 2006). 
justification of democratic legitimacy, then, ought to be given in terms of something 
else. Otherwise it would not justify anything at all 16 . Instrumentalism and 
intrinsicalism achieve this aim in different ways. While the former t (Perry 2012) 
takes democracy to be justified because of some value that democracy realizes only 
contingently, the latter takes democracy to be necessary in order to realize the 
justifying value. This means that without democracy, intended as a certain decision-
making procedure characterized at least by a right to an equal say, the justifying 
value, such as political equality, cannot be realized.  
 There is an important thing to notice, though. The fact that democracy is 
necessary for the realization of a certain value does not mean that democracy is 
justified in any possible world. There are the circumstances of politics Waldron 
outlines to be taken into account. Democracy hence is not justified under whatever 
circumstances. As we have seen, were we to agree on everything or were we to 
possess a Mysterious Machine (were we even in the condition of not needing others’ 
help to live a decent life), we could take collective decision without democracy and it 
is not the case that chosen procedures would be unjustified only because they would 
not be democratic. Therefore, the fact that we disagree on what outcomes count as 
justified, as well as on what procedure count as justified, is fundamental in any 




 The distinction I proposed does not radically change the categorization of 
available accounts for the justification of democracy. Still, it aims at three, it seems to 
me relevant, things. First, it elucidates the difference, which is sometimes blurred, 
between the justification of outcomes and the justification of democracy. While the 
former is necessarily piecemeal because it deals with individual outcomes of 
democratic procedures, the latter is necessarily holistic, as it claims to be valid for the 
whole decision-making process. Moreover, even though instrumentalists still make 
reference to the quality of outcomes, they still take outcomes to be legitimate 
(although they can sometimes be unjustified) in virtue of democratic procedures that 
produce them, as any other form of proceduralism. 
 Second, this paper means to make clearer the goal that any justification of 
democratic procedures ought to set up for itself, that is that democracy possesses the 
right to rule. Moreover, it does so by making reference to some independent, 
justifying criterion. So-called proceduralists ought not try to call for procedure-
dependent virtues of democracy (Peter 2007, 2009), but should rather focus on further 
reasons to embrace the kind of (theoretically) independent values for which 
democracy constitutes a (practically) necessary condition. It is not neutrality over 
                                                        
16 As I intend to stay neutral concerning the debate between public reason theorists and objective 
reason theorists, I do not ask that the ‘justifying’ be less controversial than the ‘justified’. It is enough 
for my argument to say that it needs be something different. It is up to the theory of justification one 
endorses to assess the value of justification if it makes reference to something more controversial to 
justify something less controversial. 
substantive values that qualify democracy as legitimate. For the distinction between 
substantive and procedural value is confusing when talking about procedures and if 
we lack a good justification for democracy, we lack legitimacy of democratic 
outcomes thereof.  
 In conclusion, it seems to me that the distinction proposed in this paper, rather 
than being merely reconstructive, fulfills a conceptually analytic role, as it helps to 
reformulate the distinction between instrumentalism and proceduralism while holding 
the focus over the justification of procedures. Moreover, since the task of justifying 
democracy as a decision-making procedure is due to the fact that we disagree over 
what are the best outcomes, any such justification of democracy ought to provide 
reasons to take the outcome as legitimate although unjustified. But this amounts to 
saying that democracy is a procedure which has the right to rule, that is the right to 
coerce people or to impose duties on them. Therefore, if a justification of democracy 
aims at lending legitimacy to democratic procedures and outcomes, it cannot do so 
without making reference to a certain independent criterion, whose truth or 
acceptance is necessary for people, who at first disagree also with the justification of 
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This does not amount to state that no decision-making procedure would be 
necessary. To be sure, in order to coordinate our actions, we would need a procedure 
to take collectively binding decisions. Nevertheless, if we were to agree on every 
single decision and we knew that we do so agree, I do not think democracy would 
necessarily be the only justified decision-making procedure. Let us look closer at this 
statement.  
 
